It took about 4 hours, but about half of it was me perfecting this Studio Ghibli themed feature image:
That immediately rang true to me. When I told my wife, she informed me I was very late to the party—that this observation had been made by many, often accompanied by the suggestion that it was Elon’s off-brand AI, Grok, that should actually be blamed.
So I decided to experiment with the idea myself. I already had a vision for how trade policy could be used to help build a better world, based on free-trade between democracies. And with ChatGPT’s help, I was able to articulate that vision more clearly—hopefully taking a bit of the blame off this perfectly useful new technology for the White House’s sloppiness.
There were moments of profound frustration, mostly when I realised I would have to do the core schlepping work of matching up the World Bank GDP numbers and the Economist Intelligence Units country rankings manually. It was another example of how AI can write poetry but can’t wash the dishes. But at other stages I was very impressed, and overall this has strengthened my prior belief that people in government, (and media and the schools and elsewhere) should be using AI (along with accountability tools like Stone Transparency.)
This proposal advocates for the establishment of a Trade Desirability Index (TDI) and a corresponding Value-Aligned Common Market, which would fundamentally reshape the international trading system. The TDI will use clear, measurable standards of democracy, human rights, labour protection, and environmental sustainability to determine market access and tariff rates. Crucially, this proposal is designed to function with or without U.S. participation, reflecting a shifting global order in which democracies must be prepared to act independently when necessary.
“The Australian government after May 3 will no doubt want to try to negotiate with the Trump administration about our 10 per cent tariff, but they might be better off to just work around it and move on.
The American age is coming to an end after 80 years and nine months and will be replaced by something that may be better.”
— Alan Kohler, ABC News (April 2025)
Source
The global trading system is in flux. Multilateralism is under threat, and unilateral protectionism—especially from powerful nations like the U.S.—has undermined trust and fairness in global trade. Democracies cannot afford to wait for leadership that may never come. Instead, they must lead, and do so together.
This policy recognises that economic power must be aligned with ethical legitimacy. We propose a mechanism that binds trade to democratic norms and sustainability, creating a new incentive structure for global governance.
The TDI is a tool that:
This creates a fair, transparent, and scalable system that rewards good governance and penalises exploitation—without relying on any one nation’s leadership.
According to 2023 global GDP figures:
| Category | GDP (USD) |
| All Democracies | $72.7 trillion |
| United States | $27.7 trillion |
| All other democracies | $44.9 trillion |
| All Authoritarian/Hybrid Regimes | $61.4 trillion |
| China | $17.8 trillion |
| Non-Chinese Non-Democracies | $43.6 trillion |
This breakdown proves two critical points:
In other words, the democratic world can act decisively and effectively, even without initial U.S. participation. Waiting for Washington to regain multilateral instincts is a risk. Moving forward without it is a necessity.
At the heart of the Trade Desirability Index (TDI) is a simple but powerful idea: countries should be rewarded in trade agreements based on how fairly, freely, and sustainably they operate. But to make that meaningful—and enforceable—it has to be more than a vibe. It needs to be measurable.
So how would we actually score countries? Here’s a proposed framework.
Ultimately, the goal is to establish an independent international bureau tasked with managing and administering the TDI on behalf of all participating countries. This agency—funded proportionally by member nations—would form the technical backbone of the Value Aligned Common Market. It would employ specialist staff with expertise in human rights law, labour standards, democratic governance, environmental science, and data auditing.
Their job would be to:
This ensures transparency, accountability, and a consistent methodology that reflects the shared values of the alliance.
However, for this example—and to demonstrate how the framework might work—we’ll use existing international data sources like the ILO, Freedom House, and Transparency International. These organisations already maintain detailed, credible metrics, and can serve as an effective starting point before the new bureau is operational.
The TDI is based on four pillars, each contributing 25% of the overall score:
Countries would receive a composite score out of 100, which would then determine the tariff rates applied to their goods and services when entering the common market. Countries with strong scores would face minimal tariffs; those with serious deficiencies would face rates as high as 40%.
Each pillar includes a set of measurable indicators. In the prototype phase, these are drawn from well-regarded international data sources. In the operational phase, they will be administered by the TDI’s in-house bureau.
| Indicator | Description | Source | Weight |
| Electoral Integrity | Free, fair, and competitive elections | Electoral Integrity Project | 10% |
| Civil Society Freedom | Ability for NGOs, media, and advocacy groups to operate | CIVICUS Monitor | 5% |
| Rule of Law | Judicial independence and limits on executive power | World Justice Project | 5% |
| Corruption Control | Degree of public sector transparency | Transparency International CPI | 5% |
| Indicator | Description | Source | Weight |
| Personal Freedoms | Press, religion, expression, assembly | Freedom House | 10% |
| Protection of Minorities | Legal protections for ethnic, religious, gender & LGBTQ+ groups | Minority Rights Group / UN | 5% |
| Legal Protections from Abuse | Anti-torture, unlawful detention, etc. | Amnesty / Human Rights Watch | 5% |
| Refugee and Asylum Policy | Fair treatment and processing of asylum seekers | UNHCR / Global Detention Project | 5% |
| Indicator | Description | Source | Weight |
| Right to Organise & Strike | Union protections and freedom of association | ITUC Global Rights Index | 10% |
| Minimum Wage Adequacy | As a percentage of median income | OECD / ILO | 5% |
| Workplace Safety | Fatality/injury rates and enforcement | ILO | 5% |
| Child Labour & Forced Labour | Prevalence and enforcement | US Dept. of Labor / ILO | 5% |
| Indicator | Description | Source | Weight |
| Carbon Emissions per Capita | Adjusted for development level | World Bank / Climate Watch | 5% |
| Renewable Energy Share | % of energy from sustainable sources | IEA | 5% |
| Environmental Regulation Enforcement | Legal strength and actual implementation | Yale EPI | 10% |
| Biodiversity & Land Protection | Forest preservation, protected areas | UNEP / WRI | 5% |
| TDI Score | Tariff Bracket | Notes |
| 90–100 | 0–2% | Full access, zero or near-zero tariffs |
| 75–89 | 5% | Strong performance, eligible for gradual reduction |
| 60–74 | 10% | Middle tier, improvement needed |
| 40–59 | 20% | Access with clear penalties |
| Below 40 | 40% | Maximum tariff rate; not eligible for cooperative status |
The TDI is more than a measurement tool—it’s a mechanism for making globalisation accountable. By attaching meaningful consequences to political repression, ecological harm, or exploitation of labour, it transforms trade from a race to the bottom into a race to the top.
With the right structure—an independent, well-resourced agency and clear, trusted criteria—the TDI can become the foundation of a truly fair international trade system.
The table below shows how a selection of countries might score under the Trade Desirability Index (TDI), based on their current performance across four pillars: democratic governance, human rights, labour protections, and environmental sustainability. Each country is assigned a TDI score out of 100, with a corresponding tariff rate calculated using a hybrid model: countries scoring below 40 receive the maximum tariff of 40%, while others are assigned a progressively lower tariff, proportionate to their score. This snapshot offers a glimpse of how a value-based trade regime could reshape global incentives—rewarding nations that uphold fairness and justice, while nudging others toward reform.
| Country | TDI Score | Tariff Rate (%) |
| Afghanistan | 8 | 40 |
| Albania | 54 | 18 |
| Algeria | 37 | 40 |
| Angola | 60 | 16 |
| Argentina | 54 | 18 |
| Armenia | 62 | 15 |
| Australia | 85 | 6 |
| Austria | 100 | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 44 | 22 |
| Bahrain | 35 | 40 |
| Bangladesh | 35 | 40 |
| Belarus | 3 | 40 |
| Belgium | 99 | 0 |
| Benin | 55 | 18 |
| Bolivia | 63 | 15 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 54 | 18 |
| Botswana | 60 | 16 |
| Brazil | 48 | 21 |
| Burkina Faso | 42 | 23 |
| Burundi | 16 | 40 |
| Cambodia | 35 | 40 |
| Cameroon | 33 | 40 |
| Canada | 73 | 11 |
| Central African Republic | 36 | 40 |
| Chad | 45 | 22 |
| Chile | 93 | 3 |
| China | 10 | 40 |
| Colombia | 61 | 16 |
| Comoros | 26 | 40 |
| Costa Rica | 99 | 0 |
| Croatia | 94 | 2 |
| Cuba | 18 | 40 |
| Cyprus | 55 | 18 |
| Czech Republic | 91 | 4 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 39 | 40 |
| Denmark | 93 | 3 |
| Djibouti | 41 | 24 |
| Dominican Republic | 44 | 22 |
| Ecuador | 65 | 14 |
| Egypt | 34 | 40 |
| El Salvador | 52 | 19 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 21 | 40 |
| Eritrea | 19 | 40 |
| Estonia | 70 | 12 |
| Eswatini | 48 | 21 |
| Ethiopia | 50 | 20 |
| Fiji | 83 | 7 |
| Finland | 98 | 1 |
| France | 78 | 9 |
| Gabon | 32 | 40 |
| Gambia | 53 | 19 |
| Georgia | 65 | 14 |
| Germany | 77 | 9 |
| Ghana | 56 | 18 |
| Greece | 68 | 13 |
| Guatemala | 59 | 16 |
| Guinea | 43 | 23 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 44 | 22 |
| Guyana | 58 | 17 |
| Haiti | 35 | 40 |
| Honduras | 46 | 22 |
| Hong Kong | 35 | 40 |
| Hungary | 85 | 6 |
| Iceland | 66 | 14 |
| India | 52 | 19 |
| Indonesia | 48 | 21 |
| Iran | 8 | 40 |
| Iraq | 40 | 24 |
| Ireland | 80 | 8 |
| Israel | 85 | 6 |
| Italy | 80 | 8 |
| Jamaica | 98 | 1 |
| Japan | 78 | 9 |
| Jordan | 43 | 23 |
| Kazakhstan | 31 | 40 |
| Kenya | 46 | 22 |
| Kuwait | 45 | 22 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 58 | 17 |
| Laos | 43 | 23 |
| Latvia | 91 | 4 |
| Lebanon | 57 | 17 |
| Lesotho | 56 | 18 |
| Liberia | 58 | 17 |
| Libya | 43 | 23 |
| Lithuania | 88 | 5 |
| Luxembourg | 95 | 2 |
| Madagascar | 39 | 40 |
| Malawi | 37 | 40 |
| Malaysia | 59 | 16 |
| Mali | 31 | 40 |
| Malta | 70 | 12 |
| Mauritania | 40 | 24 |
| Mauritius | 93 | 3 |
| Mexico | 60 | 16 |
| Moldova | 49 | 20 |
| Mongolia | 48 | 21 |
| Montenegro | 48 | 21 |
| Morocco | 50 | 20 |
| Mozambique | 33 | 40 |
| Myanmar | 7 | 40 |
| Namibia | 57 | 17 |
| Nepal | 50 | 20 |
| Netherlands | 77 | 9 |
| New Zealand | 70 | 12 |
| Nicaragua | 29 | 40 |
| Niger | 42 | 23 |
| Nigeria | 40 | 24 |
| North Korea | 13 | 40 |
| North Macedonia | 56 | 18 |
| Norway | 82 | 7 |
| Oman | 37 | 40 |
| Pakistan | 34 | 40 |
| Panama | 48 | 21 |
| Papua New Guinea | 37 | 40 |
| Paraguay | 51 | 20 |
| Peru | 48 | 21 |
| Philippines | 59 | 16 |
| Poland | 54 | 18 |
| Portugal | 71 | 12 |
| Qatar | 36 | 40 |
| Republic of the Congo | 33 | 40 |
| Romania | 87 | 5 |
| Russia | 19 | 40 |
| Rwanda | 27 | 40 |
| Saudi Arabia | 25 | 40 |
| Senegal | 57 | 17 |
| Serbia | 61 | 16 |
| Sierra Leone | 40 | 24 |
| Singapore | 98 | 1 |
| Slovakia | 75 | 10 |
| Slovenia | 92 | 3 |
| South Africa | 64 | 14 |
| South Korea | 85 | 6 |
| Spain | 81 | 8 |
| Sri Lanka | 51 | 20 |
| Sudan | 6 | 40 |
| Suriname | 38 | 40 |
| Sweden | 95 | 2 |
| Switzerland | 86 | 6 |
| Syria | 15 | 40 |
| Tajikistan | 45 | 22 |
| Tanzania | 45 | 22 |
| Thailand | 59 | 16 |
| Tunisia | 48 | 21 |
| Turkey | 41 | 24 |
| Turkmenistan | 18 | 40 |
| Uganda | 46 | 22 |
| Ukraine | 57 | 17 |
| United Arab Emirates | 35 | 40 |
| United Kingdom | 93 | 3 |
| United States | 79 | 8 |
| Uruguay | 80 | 8 |
| Uzbekistan | 45 | 22 |
| Venezuela | 9 | 40 |
| Vietnam | 44 | 22 |
| Yemen | 24 | 40 |
| Zambia | 49 | 20 |
| Zimbabwe | 5 | 40 |